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An Empty Prize
FIGHTING OVER ROCKS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA
INTRODUCTION
In September 2012, massive protests erupted throughout
China.1 Around 3,000 protestors took part in an orderly
demonstration in Shanghai, while up to 10,000 protestors turned
out in Guangzhou.2 Some of the protests even turned violent, as
authorities used tear gas to bring rowdy crowds under control
in Shenzhen, and various other cities saw incidents of arson
and attacks on cars and businesses.3 These protests were not,
however, about domestic economic, political, or social concerns.
Rather, they represented an outpouring of anti-Japanese
sentiment resulting from a dispute over the ownership of
several tiny uninhabited islands in the East China Sea.4
The islands have been the subject of a tense sovereignty
dispute between China and Japan for decades.5 Called the
Senkakus by the Japanese, and the Diaoyus by the Chinese,
the uninhabited islands are centrally located in the East China
Sea, approximately 120 nautical miles to the northeast of
Taiwan, 200 nautical miles to the east of mainland China, and
240 nautical miles to the southwest of Okinawa, Japan.6 They
consist of eight individual formations.7 The five largest islands
are volcanic structures, while the remaining three are
1 N. D., Anti-Japan Protests: Outrage, to a Point, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2012,
7:18 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/09/anti-japan-protests.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Could Asia Really Go to War Over These?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 2012, at
13, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21563316 [hereinafter Over These?].
5 See Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the
Senkaku Islands, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 903, 904 (2008). It should also be noted that
Taiwan claims sovereignty over the islands as well. In fact, China’s claim is primarily
derivative of its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan itself. See Steven Wei Su, The
Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update, 36 OCEAN DEV. &
INT’L L. 45, 56 n.2 (2005). But for the sake of simplicity, the discussion in this note is
limited to the dispute as between China and Japan.
6 Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 903.
7 Wei Su, supra note 5, at 46.
1746 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:4
described as “rocky outcroppings.”8 Several of the islands have
some vegetative covering, while the rest are barren.9
The total land area of all eight formations is
approximately 2.7 square miles.10 Thus, the islands themselves
appear to be of little value. However, some experts and
commentators believe that the seas around the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands contain extensive deposits of oil and natural gas.11 This
has led China and Japan to assert opposing claims of
sovereignty over the Senkakus/Diaoyus, each country bolstering
its claim with a variety of historical and legal theories.12 These
opposing claims have hampered Sino-Japanese relations for
decades.13 Although the dispute periodically goes into
remission,14 tensions created by it have continuously frustrated
attempts to delimit the broader maritime boundary between the
countries—an issue which remains unresolved.15 In the past
several years, the dispute has reignited, triggered by the
Japanese government’s move to purchase some of the islands
from their private owner, and resulting in the sometimes-violent
anti-Japanese protests discussed above.16
The most recent tensions have led some commentators
to speculate that actual military conflict could result.17 There is
good reason to believe that certain parties on both sides would
relish such a result. Indeed, one Chinese newspaper reportedly
suggested “skipping the pointless diplomacy and moving
straight to the main course by serving up Japan with an atom
bomb.”18 Obviously, the governments of both countries would
prefer to avoid armed confrontation, but the risk is real. Past
flare-ups have resulted in standoffs involving military forces.19
Media reports indicate near-daily confrontations between
Chinese and Japanese vessels in the waters near the islands.20
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Dai Tan, The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute: Bridging the Cold Divide, 5 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 134, 136 (2006).
11 SELIG S. HARRISON, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, ASIA
PROGRAM, SEABED PETROLEUM IN NORTHEAST ASIA: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION? 5-6
(2005), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Asia_petroleum.pdf.
12 See Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 904.
13 See id.
14 Over These?, supra note 4, at 13.
15 Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 904.
16 Over These?, supra note 4, at 13.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See, Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 904-05.
20 Blunt Words and Keen Swords: Why China Seems to Be Fanning the
Flames of Its Row with Japan in the East China Sea, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2012, at 48,
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Of particular concern in this country is the fact that the United
States would most likely be drawn into any armed escalation.21
The United States, while remaining officially neutral on the
sovereignty issue, has recognized that the terms of its Mutual
Security Treaty with Japan would require it to respond to any
military incursion over the islands.22
The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, in its most recent
iteration, takes place in the context of rising Chinese and
Japanese nationalism and increasing dependence on imported
petro-products to satisfy domestic energy requirements in both
China and Japan.23 These concerns motivate the political actors
on both sides, while various aspects of international law frame
the legal arguments and set out the consequences of a successful
claim over the islands. The primary strategic importance of
sovereignty over the Senkakus/Diaoyus is considered by most
commentators to be both their presumed ability to project an
Exclusive Economic Zone over the surrounding waters and their
ability to potentially shift the broader maritime border between
China and Japan in favor of the prevailing party.24
The international law of the sea governs the
consequences of a successful sovereignty claim over the
Senkakus/Diaoyus, as far as maritime rights are concerned. The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
state practice, and the relevant decisions of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) set out the general framework under which
law of the sea issues are considered by state actors.25 UNCLOS
sets out the rights of coastal states to various levels of sovereignty
and control over radiating zones of their surrounding seas.26
Notably, UNCLOS grants states an Exclusive Economic Zone
available at http://www.economist.com/news/china/21565980-why-china-seems-be-
fanning-flames-its-row-japan-east-china-sea-blunt-words.
21 See, Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 905.
22 Over These?, supra note 4, at 14.
23 Protesting Too Much, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 2012, at 53; Ramos-Mrosovsky,
supra note 5, at 907 n.18 (noting that Japan is the world’s second-largest oil importer,
while China is third); Foot on the Gas, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 2012, at 48 (noting that
Japan is “the world’s biggest importer of liquefied natural gas”).
24 See infra Part III.
25 See Jonathan G. Odom, A China in the Bull Shop? Comparing the Rhetoric
of a Rising China with the Reality of the International Law of the Sea, 17 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 201, 207 (2012); John M. Van Dyke, The Romania v. Ukraine Decision
and its Effect on East Asian Maritime Delimitations, 15 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 261,
271-72 (2010). Both China and Japan are signatories to and have ratified UNCLOS.
See Tan, supra note 10, at 134.
26 See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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(EEZ) extending out to 200 nautical miles beyond their
territorial seas and contiguous zones.27 Within the EEZ, a state
has the exclusive right to explore and exploit natural resources,
including fisheries and mineral, oil, or gas deposits.28
Much has been written about the various legal claims
asserted by China and Japan to support their arguments for
sovereignty over the Senkakus/Diaoyus, with most
commentators assuming that the “winner” would benefit from
an enormously valuable EEZ around the islands.29 This view is
mistaken. Modern ICJ case law indicates an emerging
consensus that, under UNCLOS, small, uninhabited offshore
islands do not project their own EEZ or greatly impact
maritime boundary delimitation.30 Indeed, the dispute itself
stands as one of the principal barriers to allowing either
country to efficiently capitalize on the energy resources under
the East China Sea, as the parties are instead focused on
aggressively defending against any perceived incursion by the
other into the waters around the islands.31
This note argues that negotiating a final delimitation of
the seabed boundary between China and Japan is in fact the
most effective means by which both countries can benefit from
the alleged resources surrounding the Senkakus/Diaoyus. For
this reason, ideas of sovereignty over the islands should be set
aside for the time being, with diplomatic effort instead put
toward approaching a final agreement on the delimitation of the
seabed boundary. Taking contentious island disputes off the table
will allow bilateral boundary negotiations to be more productive,
eventually allowing both countries to benefit from unobstructed
exploitation of resources on their respective sides of the line.
27 Id. pt. V.
28 Odom, supra note 25, at 210.
29 See, e.g., William B. Heflin, Diayou/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and
China, Oceans Apart, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 18:1, 2 (2000) (“The islands are of
little economic value; however, the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
that the islands can generate under the [UNCLOS] are rich in fishing stock and may be
rich in gas and oil deposits” (internal footnotes omitted)); Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra
note 5, at 908 (“The chief benefit of sovereignty over the Senkaku islands is their
presumed ability, under UNCLOS, to project areas of maritime jurisdiction over the
East China Sea.”); Tan, supra note 10, at 137 (“Because the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
have the potential to satisfy the criteria of Article 121(3), China and Japan have
sufficient reason to believe that possession of the islands will widen their respective
EEZ claims to some degree.”).
30 See Van Dyke, supra note 25, at 271-72; see also Maritime Delimitation in
the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment, (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://icj.cij.org/
docket/files/132/14987.pdf.
31 See, e.g., Senkaku Islands: Japan Sends Jets in China Row, SKYNEWS (Jan. 7,
2014), http://news.sky.com/story/1191448/senkaku-islands-japan-sends-jets-in-china-row.
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Part I of this note will present the history of the
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and provide an overview of the
arguments supporting each side’s claim. Part II will discuss the
relevant legal framework for the law of the sea, and
particularly the status of islands under UNCLOS. Part III will
discuss the emerging consensus concerning the status of
islands in the resolution of boundary disputes, as evidenced by
ICJ case law, indicating that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands
would neither be entitled to their own EEZ, nor would they
significantly impact a judicial delimitation of the broader
maritime boundary. Part IV will discuss why China and Japan
should set aside sovereignty issues for the time being and work
instead toward reaching an agreement on delimiting their
broader maritime border, indicating some of the challenges
faced by both in reaching such a resolution. And finally, Part V
will provide suggestions for moving towards a final boundary
settlement, as well as suggest an amendment to UNCLOS that
should help to avoid similar future disputes around the world.
I. HISTORY OF SENKAKU/DIAOYUDISPUTE
China and Japan both ground their sovereignty claims
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands on historical as well as legal
arguments. The parties’ positions and a brief history of the
conflict are outlined below.32
A. Japanese Claims
Japan dates its claim to the islands to 1895.33 In that year,
the Japanese government declared that the islands were terra
nullius (“land belonging to no one”) and announced an intention
to annex and exert sovereignty over them.34 Japan bases its claim,
under the modern international law of territorial acquisition, on
“occupation and discovery, effective exercise of sovereignty, and
Chinese acquiescence.”35 It claims to have exercised effective
sovereignty by regulating economic activity on the islands, leasing
them to private individuals, and policing the islands.36
32 For a much more comprehensive discussion of the historical claims made
by the parties, see UNRYU SUGANUMA, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND TERRITORIAL SPACE IN
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS: IRREDENTISM AND THEDIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS (2000).
33 See Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 917.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 923.
36 See id.
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B. Chinese Claims
The modern dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
arose shortly after the publication of a 1968 Survey by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East.37 The survey, along with later geological expeditions,
supports the idea that the seas surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands contain enormously valuable oil and gas reserves.38
Shortly after publication of the UN Survey, China began
to vociferously dispute Japan’s claim to the islands, stating
that the islands “have been China’s territory since ancient
times.”39 China’s claim to the islands is mostly based on
historical perspective.40 First, China claims that it exercised
sovereignty over the islands since at least the fourteenth
century, when Chinese sailors used them as navigational aids
and sometimes for shelter from storms.41 China further argues
that Japan seized the islands from China in the Sino-Japanese
War of 1895.42 China insists that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands
are part of the Taiwan island group, which was ceded to Japan
after the war.43 This argument further asserts that, as part of
the Taiwan group of islands, the Senkakus/Diaoyus were
restored to China by the Cairo Declaration of 1943.44
II. THE LAW OF THE SEA FRAMEWORK
This note makes no attempt to analyze the respective
strengths of the parties’ claims. This topic has been ably discussed
in numerous other articles.45 Rather, this note proposes that
sovereignty over the islands is of extremely limited practical
37 K.O. Emery et al., Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of
the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, 2 UNECAFE/CCOP Tech. Bull. 3 (1969), noted
in Hungdah Chiu, An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the T’iaoyutai Islets
(Senkaku Gunto), 15 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 9, 11 n.4 (1996-97).
38 See HARRISON, supra note 11, at 5-6.
39 See Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 918 (quoting Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the People’s Republic of China, Statement regarding Chinese Sovereignty (Dec. 30, 1971)).
40 See id. at 925.
41 See id.
42 See Alexander M. Peterson, Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the East China
Sea: A Lasting Arrangement?, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 441, 448 (2009).
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See, e.g., id. at 452 (concluding that Japan has a stronger claim under
international law); Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5 (same); see alsoWei Su, supra note 5, at
46 (arguing that China has the superior claim); Han-Yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2012), http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/09/19/the-inconvenient-truth-behidn-the-diaoyusenkaku-islands/ (same).
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value, in terms of territorial or resource rights, in light of the
current law-of-the-sea framework.
A. Pre-1945
The modern law of the sea developed over decades, as
customary state practice came to be codified in international
agreements. Prior to 1945, the rights and responsibilities of states
with regard to the world’s oceans were largely regulated by
customary international law.46 There existed near-universal
agreement among states regarding some law–of-the-sea issues,
such as the freedom of navigation on the high seas, while other
issues were subject to bitter dispute.47 Recognizing the need to
form a consensus on these important issues to ensure peace and
continued development, international bodies began the long
process of attempting to comprehensively codify the law of the
sea. This process was jump-started in part by the Truman
Proclamation of 1945, which greatly influenced the approach
taken in the early efforts to produce a comprehensive law-of-
the-sea framework.48
B. The Truman Proclamation and the Continental Shelf
Convention
In 1945, the United States unilaterally declared sovereign
jurisdiction over the continental shelf extending beyond the
country’s territorial seas.49 The term “continental shelf” refers
to the portion of seabed surrounding a coastal state that
constitutes a “natural prolongation” of the state’s land mass.50
The shelf generally ends where the seabed makes a steep and
sudden descent to the deep sea floor. This declaration
evidenced a growing recognition of the importance of seabed
resources, which were newly accessible due to technological
advances, and inspired extensive debate and discussions about
the continental shelf concept.51 The idea that the continental
46 See Patricia O’Brien, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, U.N.
Office of Legal Affairs, Speech at the Yeosu World Expo (Aug. 12, 2012), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/Statement%20POB%20YEOSU.pdf.
47 See id.
48 See Keun-Gwan Lee, Continental Shelf Delimitation in the East China Sea,
WOODROW WILSON INT’L CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, ASIA PROGRAM, at 2 (Sept. 28, 2012),
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Keun-Gwan_Lee_1_.pdf.
49 Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the
Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945).
50 See UNCLOS, supra note 26, at art. 76.
51 See O’Brien, supra note 46.
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shelf should be the touchstone for determining coastal state
sovereignty pervaded early law of the sea discussions and
continues to find relevance under the modern framework.
Recognizing that international consensus was needed to
ensure peaceful and efficient exploitation of offshore ocean
resources, the United Nations adopted the Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf (Continental Shelf Convention) in
1958.52 The Continental Shelf Convention officially codified the
idea found in the Truman Proclamation, and subsequently
adopted by numerous other states, that a coastal state has
certain sovereign rights over its continental shelf, including the
exclusive right to exploit the natural resources found there.53
The Continental Shelf Convention also introduced the
concept of “equidistance/special circumstances” in the
delimitation of maritime boundaries.54 The equidistance/special
circumstances concept provides that when two countries with
coastlines opposite each other share a continental shelf, the
seabed boundary between them should be determined by first
drawing a line equidistant from the two countries’ baselines
(low-tide shorelines, essentially), and then adjusting the line to
account for any “special circumstances.”55
C. The North Sea Case
The International Court of Justice’s decision in the
North Sea Continental Shelf case56 severely undermined the
equidistance principle set forth in the Continental Shelf
Convention. In this 1969 decision, the ICJ famously declared
that maritime boundary “delimitation is to be effected by
agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking
account of all the relevant circumstances . . . .”57 The decision
explicitly disclaimed the idea that equidistance should always
be the primary analytical starting point in delimitation cases,
instead introducing the concepts of “equitable principles” and
52 Lee, supra note 48, at 2.
53 Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S.
311 (entered into force June 10, 1964).
54 The equidistance/special circumstances principle only becomes relevant “[i]n
the absence of agreement” between the states. Id. at art. 6; see also Lee, supra note 48, at 3.
55 Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 53, at art. 6. “Special
circumstances” might include such things as the existence of coastal islands or a large
discrepancy between the respective lengths of opposing coastlines, among others. See
infra Part III.B.
56 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
57 Id. at 54.
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“relevant circumstances,” ideas that were not explicitly
mentioned in any of the existing international agreements.58
This decision caused a great deal of confusion, as it did not seem
to follow the existing law-of-the-sea framework, and instead
focused on consultations and fairness.59 The decision further
undermined the existing legal framework relating to maritime
border delimitation by characterizing the continental shelf as a
“natural prolongation” of a coastal state’s landmass,60 encouraging
sovereign claims over ever greater extensions of the shelf.
D. UNCLOS
Today, the law-of-the-sea framework is embodied in
UNCLOS, a comprehensive agreement covering all aspects of
international maritime law, including border disputes, piracy,
rights of transit, freedom on the high seas, pollution, and fisheries
management.61 Recognizing the continuing uncertainty regarding
various law-of-the-sea issues, the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in New York in
1973.62 The result was UNCLOS, adopted in 1982 after nearly 10
years of negotiations, and entered into force on November 16,
1994, one year after being ratified by the sixtieth country.63 As of
March 2014, UNCLOS has been officially adopted by 166 of the
United Nations’ member states.64 Both China and Japan have
ratified UNCLOS and are officially bound by its provisions.65
UNCLOS formalizes the rights and responsibilities of
states over concentric bands of ocean emanating out from the
coast.66 First, UNCLOS provides that the area of the different
zones will be measured by their distance from established
58 Id.; Lee, supra note 48, at 3.
59 Lee, supra note 48, at 3.
60 North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3.
61 See UNCLOS, supra note 26.
62 The “First” conference resulted in the Continental Shelf Convention, while
a “Second,” in 1960, did not result in any binding agreements. O’Brien, supra note 46.
63 Id.
64 See U.N. DIV. FOROCEAN AFFAIRS& THE LAW OF THE SEA, CHRONOLOGICAL
LISTS OF RATIFICATIONS OF, ACCESSIONS AND SUCCESSIONS TO THE CONVENTION AND
RELATED AGREEMENTS AS AT 29 OCTOBER 2013, http://www.un.org/Depts/lost/
reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (last updated Sept. 20, 2013).
65 See id. Although the United States has not officially ratified the
Convention, it does consider it to embody customary international law. See Jonathan I.
Charney, Rocks That Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 863, 872
n.39 (1999); Wendy N. Duong, Following the Path of Oil: The Law of the Sea or
Realpolitik – What Good Does Law Do in the South China Sea Territorial Conflicts?, 30
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1098, 1133-36 (2007).
66 See Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 910.
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baselines.67 Normally, the baseline is determined by the low-
tide water line along a nation’s coast.68 Under certain limited
circumstances, a state is entitled to draw “straight baselines,”
which do not directly follow the water line but rather are
constituted by straight lines drawn between distinct points
along the coast.69 A state is only entitled to draw straight
baselines if its coastline is “deeply indented or cut into, or if
there is a fringe of islands along the coast.”70
Under UNCLOS, all waters on the landward side of a
state’s baseline are considered internal waters, where the state
has sovereign rights to the same extent as its rights over its
land territory.71 Immediately outside the baseline is a 12-
nautical-mile zone of territorial waters, where the state also
has full national sovereign jurisdiction, with the exception that
the state must allow “innocent passage” of foreign vessels.72
UNCLOS further establishes that coastal states are entitled to
a “contiguous zone” extending a further 12 nautical miles
beyond the territorial waters, where states are entitled to
exercise the control necessary to ensure compliance with
customs, immigration, or sanitary laws applicable to the
territorial sea, and to punish infringement of those laws.73
Of particular concern for the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute,
UNCLOS established the modern Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) regime.74 Under UNCLOS, coastal states enjoy certain
sovereign rights over an area extending up to 200 nautical
miles from the country’s baseline.75 These sovereign rights are
limited in nature but, most importantly, include exclusive
resource exploration and exploitation rights within this zone.76
As the Convention states, within the EEZ, a coastal state has
“sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, . . . and with
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and
67 UNCLOS, supra note 26, at arts. 5-14.
68 Id. at art. 5.
69 Id. at art. 7.
70 Id. Partial straight baselines may also be drawn across the mouth of “a
river [that] flows directly into the sea” or a juridical bay. Id.; see also Odom, supra
note 25, at 208-09.
71 UNCLOS, supra note 26, at art. 8.
72 SeeUNCLOS, supra note 26, at art. 17; Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 910.
73 UNCLOS, supra note 26, at art. 33.
74 Id. at arts. 55-75.
75 Id. at art. 57; Odom, supra note 25, at 210.
76 Odom, supra note 25, at 210.
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exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from
the water, currents and winds . . . .”77
UNCLOS also contains a separate continental shelf regime,
parallel to and supplementing, the EEZ regime.78 Coastal states
are entitled to rights similar to those applicable in the EEZ over
their continental shelf, namely, “sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring [the shelf] and exploiting its natural resources.”79 Under
certain circumstances, the continental shelf regime allows a state
to extend the area over which it may exercise these rights beyond
the 200 nautical mile EEZ, up to a maximum of 350 nautical
miles.80 In this respect, the Convention imports the “natural
prolongation” principle central to theNorth Sea case.
UNCLOS is notably vague when it comes to
determining the appropriate size of an EEZ or continental shelf
when the EEZs of two states overlap, or where two states share
a continental shelf. In both cases, the Convention simply states
that delimitation will be determined “by agreement on the
basis of international law . . . in order to achieve an equitable
solution.”81 This is particularly notable here, because “[t]he
East China Sea is only 360 nautical miles across at its widest
point,” meaning that the EEZ’s of China and Japan necessarily
overlap to some degree.82
Finally, Article 121 of UNCLOS establishes the law-of-
the-sea framework for determining the status of islands, known
as UNCLOS’s “Regime of Islands.”83 This extremely brief
section, containing only three short sentences, establishes that
islands, as defined in the Article, are entitled to the same
territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, and continental shelves
as coastal states.84 “[I]sland” is defined as “a naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide.”85 However, Paragraph 3 of Article 121 clarifies that “[r]ocks
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.”86 This paragraph has been the subject of some debate.
One noted commentator has proposed that neither full-time
77 UNCLOS, supra note 26, at art. 56(1)(a).
78 Id. at arts. 76-77.
79 Id. at art. 77.
80 Id. at art. 76.
81 Id. at art. 74.
82 Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 911.
83 UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 121.
84 Id. at art. 121.
85 Id. at pt. VIII.
86 Id.
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human habitation, nor a self-sustaining, land-based economic
life is required for full island status.87 Under the bare text of
the Convention, seasonal habitation or an economic life based
on the sea resources in the surrounding waters may be enough
to confer full EEZ rights.88 Nonetheless, this interpretation runs
counter to the purpose for adoption of Article 121(3), which was
“to ensure that insignificant features, particularly those far from
areas claimed by other states, could not generate broad zones of
national jurisdiction in the middle of the ocean.”89
III. MODERN CONSENSUS EMERGES ON THE ROLE OF
ISLANDS
The primary strategic importance of sovereignty over
the Senkakus/Diaoyus is considered by most commentators to
be both their presumed ability to project their own EEZ and
their ability to influence the delimitation of the broader
maritime border between China and Japan.90 As UNCLOS does
not provide extensive guidance on the matter, the relevance of
sovereignty over small islands like the Senkakus/Diaoyus to
broader maritime boundary delimitation issues is not entirely
clear. There is a hardening consensus, however, observable in a
series of decisions of the ICJ and the decisions of other
international tribunals and adjudicators dating back to the
1970s, that small, uninhabited islands far from shore neither
confer EEZ rights nor affect boundary delimitation in any
significant way. Following this consensus, such islands, even
some that clearly do not fit the definition of “rocks” under
UNCLOS, will be denied extensive sovereign rights. They will
only be entitled to a limited 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and
contiguous zone, particularly if a full EEZ would produce what
could be considered an inequitable result.91 This gradual
diminishing of the islands’ effect on boundary delimitation
appears to correlate with a parallel trend away from the
natural prolongation principle in delimitation cases.
87 See Charney, supra note 65, at 868-71.
88 See id.
89 Id. at 866.
90 See generally UNCLOS, supra note 26.
91 See Van Dyke, supra note 25.
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A. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Would Not Project Their
Own EEZ
Under the modern understanding of the international law-
of-the-sea framework, it is unlikely that the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands will be entitled to their own EEZ. As noted above, Article
121(3) of UNCLOS provides that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”92 The Convention
does not provide any further definition of what constitutes a
rock, as opposed to an island that is entitled to full zones of
national jurisdiction.
A noted expert on law-of-the-sea issues, Jonathan
Charney, has argued that the Article’s vagueness implies that
the requirement of “human habitation” or “economic life of [its]
own” need not be tied to the island in its natural state.93
Charney states that, “Ocean features that were not capable of
sustaining human habitation or did not have an economic life in
the past, but subsequently developed those capabilities owing to
changes in economic demand, technological innovations or new
human activities, would . . . not be Article 121(3) rocks.”94 This
makes a great deal of sense, because many small islands that
undoubtedly do not fit the UNCLOS definition of rocks today
were likely at some point in history both uninhabited and
unable to support an economic life of their own.
But Charney takes his argument too far. He boldly
claims that the text of Article 121(3) does not require either
year-round human habitation or self-sustaining economic life to
take an island outside the definition of “rock,”95 and that
“economic life” could be entirely based on activities in the
waters around the island, as opposed to being necessarily tied
to the island itself.96 Adhering to Charney’s definition would
likely eviscerate the limitations found in Article 121(3)
completely. Any island whose surrounding waters could be
profitably fished would no longer be a rock, and would be
entitled to the full complement of sovereignty zones under
UNCLOS. This was certainly not the intention of the
negotiating parties. Luckily, the decisions of various
international tribunals have made clear that Charney’s
92 UNCLOS, supra note 26, at art. 121.
93 Charney, supra note 65, at 867.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 868-71.
96 Id. at 870.
1758 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:4
interpretation does not constitute the general understanding of
UNCLOS’s Regime of Islands.
While neither the ICJ nor any other authoritative
international tribunal has ever gone so far as to express its own
more detailed definition of a “rock” under UNCLOS, the treatment
of such features in various cases provides insight into the general
understanding of Article 121(3). In a range of decisions dating back
to the 1969 North Sea cases, adjudicators have consistently
“ignored or . . . given greatly reduced effect” to small features when
determining national maritime entitlements.97 Even before the
adoption of the 1982 Convention, in the Anglo-French Continental
Shelf arbitration,98 for example, the arbitrator enclaved the British
Channel Islands within the French continental shelf, limiting them
to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.99
State practice also confirms this understanding. For
example, in the 2007 Nicaragua/Honduras Territorial Dispute
case,100 the parties stipulated and agreed that the islands at
issue, some of which were in fact inhabited, were not entitled to
“any maritime areas beyond the territorial sea.”101
Furthermore, as the East China Sea is only 360 nautical miles
across at its widest point, the EEZs of China and Japan
already overlap, meaning that a theoretical EEZ around the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands would push the “winning” party’s area
of jurisdiction all the way up to the other’s doorstep. This
would run contrary to the concern for reaching an “equitable
result” under UNCLOS, and would therefore be ruled out.
The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands should be considered rocks
under UNCLOS Article 121(3), entitled to a 24-nautical-mile
territorial sea and contiguous zone, but not an EEZ or
continental shelf. The islands are tiny, with a total land mass
of only 2.7 square miles,102 completely uninhabited, and devoid
of appreciable natural resources. While the waters around the
islands are believed to be rich in hydrocarbon deposits, this
should not be sufficient to accord the Senkakus/Diaoyus the
full complement of sovereignty zones.
97 Van Dyke, supra note 25, at 271-72.
98 Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Fr. v. U.K.), 18
I.L.M. 397 (1978).
99 Stuart Kaye, Lessons Learned from the Gulf of Maine Case: The
Development of Maritime Boundary Delimitation Jurisprudence Since UNCLOS III, 14
OCEAN&COASTAL L.J. 73, 85 (2008).
100 Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the
Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), 2007 I.C.J. 659 (Oct. 8).
101 Van Dyke, supra note 25, at 273 (citing Nicar. v. Hond., 2007 I.C.J. 659).
102 Tan, supra note 10, at 136.
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This result is consistent with the purposes of Article 121
and the EEZ concept more generally. As Jon Van Dyke notes
in his article about the consequences of the recent
Romania/Ukraine case,
Judge Budislav Vukas of the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea explained in his opinion . . . in the Russia v. Australia
case . . . that the purpose for giving exclusive rights over offshore
resources to coastal states . . . was to protect the economic interests of the
coastal communities that depended on the resources of the sea and thus to
promote their development and enable them to feed themselves.103
This rationale is clearly not implicated in the case of
uninhabited islands like the Senkakus/Diaoyus.
B. Modern Approach to Maritime Boundary Delimitation
While the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are unlikely to be
entitled to their own EEZ or otherwise expanded zone of
national sovereignty, an alternative concern would involve
their potential effect on a future delimitation of the broader
maritime boundary between China and Japan. If the islands
have a material effect on the drawing of the boundary, then the
sovereignty dispute will continue to impede delimitation
negotiations. Fortunately, the decisions of international
tribunals provide a great deal of guidance in this area. Recent
decisions have elucidated a relatively structured methodology
for maritime boundary delimitation between opposite coastal
states, under which small features like the Senkakus/Diaoyus
are given little to no weight.
Before addressing the role of islands and small features
in determining maritime boundaries, it is necessary to consider
the general framework applicable to delimitation decisions.
Prior to the adoption of UNCLOS, maritime boundary
delimitation between opposing coasts was not guided by any
single dominant approach. The 1958 Continental Shelf
Convention urged equidistance as the overriding concern.104
Yet, as discussed above, the ICJ’s decision in the North Sea
103 Van Dyke, supra note 25, at 273-74; but see Kaye, supra note 99, at 83
(noting that Jan Mayen, an “island[ ] occupied only by research scientists and their
support staff, without any indigenous population,” albeit much larger in size than the
Senkakus/Diaoyus, was granted a full EEZ by the ICJ).
104 Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 53, at art. 6.
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cases introduced the idea of “natural prolongation,”105 and this
became the primary guiding principle for a number of years.106
Under UNCLOS, conflicts over the delimitation of the
boundary between overlapping EEZs and continental shelves
are supposed to be resolved by “agreement on the basis of
international law” to reach an “equitable solution.”107 These
vague provisions provide no concrete guiding principles.
Nonetheless, the Convention’s provision regarding overlapping
territorial seas still requires the use of equidistance in
resolving disputes.108 Additionally, it has been suggested that
the “equitable principles” referred to in the article concerning
the EEZ and continental shelf incorporate the equidistance
principle from the earlier article on the territorial sea.109
The decisions of international tribunals, since the
adoption of UNCLOS, have also made clear that equidistance
has won out as the dominant approach. In the 1977 Anglo-
French Continental Shelf case,110 “the Court of Arbitration
[chose] to ignore the Hurd Deep [a deep trench in the English
Channel] . . . , preferring the view that the faults did not
‘disrupt the essential unity of the continental shelf.’ Natural
prolongation was held no longer to be paramount, but rather ‘in
certain situations’ subject to ‘equitable principles.’”111
This trend away from natural prolongation continued in
subsequent cases. In the 1982 Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf
case,112 the ICJ declared that natural prolongation “would not
necessarily be sufficient, or even appropriate, in itself to
determine the precise extent of the rights” between adjacent or
opposing coastal states.113 The 1984 Gulf of Maine case114
marked a further step away from the importance of natural
prolongation. In its decision, the court “indicated that
geographic adjacency better expressed the link between a State
and its submarine entitlements than natural prolongation, and
that any boundary drawn would be derived by operation of
105 Lee, supra note 48, at 3.
106 See supra Part II.
107 UNCLOS, supra note 26, at arts. 74, 83.
108 Id. at art. 75.
109 Lee, supra note 48, at 8.
110 Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (France v. U.K.),
18 I.L.M. 397 (1978).
111 Kaye, supra note 99, at 75 (internal footnotes omitted).
112 Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24).
113 Id. at 46.
114 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
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international law rather than ‘physical fact.’”115 This further
demonstrated the emerging view that equitable principles
would take precedence over geology in delimitation cases.
Finally, the 1985 Libya/Malta case116 signaled a turning
point in the modern ICJ jurisprudence regarding maritime
boundary delimitation.117 The court adopted a structured
framework where it would first draw an equidistant line
between the parties’ opposing coasts, and then take into
account relevant “special circumstances,” meaning primarily
geographical factors, in determining whether any adjustments
were necessary to avoid an inequitable result.118 By explicitly
adopting equidistance as the starting point for determining
maritime boundaries, the Libya/Malta court demonstrated a
clear break from the previous natural prolongation, or
geologically based, framework. A number of more recent cases
follow the two-step framework from Libya/Malta, further
diminishing the importance of natural prolongation as a
methodological approach. For example, in the St. Pierre and
Miquelon case,119 “the Court of Arbitration . . . did not mention
natural prolongation in its initial discussion of how to approach
a maritime delimitation.”120
The ICJ, in the 2002 Cameroon/Nigeria case, succinctly
expressed the now-dominant delimitation approach:
The Court has on various occasions made it clear what the applicable
criteria, principles and rules of delimitation are when a line covering
several zones of coincident jurisdictions is to be determined. They are
expressed in the so-called equitable principles/relevant circumstances
method. This method, which is very similar to the equidistance/special
circumstances method applicable in delimitation of the territorial sea,
involves first drawing an equidistance line, then considering whether
there are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of that line in
order to achieve an “equitable result.”121
Of particular significance for the discussion in this note is
that these more recent cases, in considering whether relevant
115 Kaye, supra note 99, at 76 (quoting Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in
Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 293 (Oct. 12).
116 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3).
117 See Phaedon John Kozyris, Lifting the Veils of Equity in Maritime
Entitlements: Equidistance with Proportionality Around the Islands, 26 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 319, 342-43 (1998).
118 Lee, supra note 48, at 4.
119 Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic
(Can. v. Fr.), 31 I.L.M 1149 (1992).
120 Kaye, supra note 99, at 77.
121 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon
v. Nigeria), 2002 I.C.J. 303, 441 (Oct. 10).
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circumstances merit an adjustment to the equidistant boundary
line, have consistently disregarded small, uninhabited islands.122
C. The Role of Small Islands and Other Features in
Delimitation Decisions
Under the modern approach to maritime boundary
delimitation, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are unlikely to carry
much, if any, weight in determining a final maritime boundary
between China and Japan. Recent decisions of international
tribunals in delimitation cases consistently disregard or
minimize the effect of offshore islands on boundary
delimitation. In the 1999 Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the
tribunal completely disregarded “the uninhabited Yemeni
island of Jabal al-Tayr and . . . the Zubayr group . . . , stating
simply that their ‘barren and inhospitable nature and their
position well out to sea mean that they should not be taken into
consideration in computing the boundary line.’”123 These islands
are at least as prominent as the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, with
lighthouses and a steady stream of beach-going visitors.124
In other cases, the ICJ and other tribunals have
recognized the relevance of islands in drawing a boundary line,
but accorded them only half or reduced effect. This is generally
the case when larger and more significant islands than the
Senkakus/Diaoyus are present. For example, in the Gulf of
Maine case, the ICJ accorded Machias Seal Island only reduced
effect on the final delimitation.125 This was despite the fact that
the island contains a lighthouse (staffed year-round) and
several houses, and is visited by bird-watching tours.126
Similarly, in the St. Pierre and Miquelon case, the court
“reduced the impact of [the] two islands [at issue] as against
the Newfoundland coast . . . .”127 The islands at issue in that
case had a total land area of 242 square kilometers, and a
population of approximately 5,831 people.128 Certainly the tiny
122 See Van Dyke, supra note 25, at 273-74.
123 Id. at 272.
124 Id.
125 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Kaye, supra note 99, at 84.
126 Machias Seal Island, IMPORTANT BIRD AREAS CANADA,
http://www.ibacanada.com/site.jsp?siteID=NB019&lang=EN (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
127 Kaye, supra note 99, at 84.
128 World Factbook: Saint Pierre and Miquelon, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sb.html (last visited
Nov. 15, 2012).
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unpopulated Senkaku/Diaoyu islands would have a far lesser
impact on any final boundary delimitation than these.
It is clear that the ICJ and other international tribunals
have accorded decreasing importance to small islands in
deciding larger boundary delimitation issues. Under the
modern interpretations of UNCLOS in delimitation cases, the
Senkakus/Diaoyus would not be entitled to their own EEZ, nor
would they be significantly taken into account in determining
an equitable median line boundary. These tiny, uninhabited
formations, far from the shores of both China and Japan, are
unlikely to be accorded even the reduced effect exemplified by the
Gulf of Maine and St. Pierre and Miquelon cases. It is far more
likely that they would be disregarded altogether, or enclaved
within the EEZ of the opposing party, were the parties to submit
the dispute to an international body for delimitation purposes.
The political actors on both sides of the dispute are likely
aware of this reality. The fight over the Senkakus/Diaoyus is
therefore less about competition for resource rights than it is
about rising Chinese and Japanese nationalism and the
simmering competition for Asian hegemony. The islands are a
convenient focal point for both sides to use in pressing broader
goals of regional influence.129 The escalating tensions and
rhetoric from both sides are a reflection of these broader
political concerns, rather than any real concern for the
strategic importance of the islands.130
IV. THE CASE FOR AND CHALLENGES TO BORDER
DELIMITATION
A. The Case for Border Delimitation
While the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute continues to fill the
headlines and occupy the attention of Chinese and Japanese
decision-makers, the lack of a final delimitation of the broader
seabed boundary between the countries stands as an even more
fundamental roadblock to improved relations and mutual
resource exploitation. Without a mutually agreed boundary,
both sides are incentivized to make bold, and sometimes
129 See, e.g., Face-off: China’s New Air-Defence Zone Suggests a Worrying New
Approach in the Region, ECONOMIST (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21590930-chinas-new-air-defence-zone-suggests-worrying-new-approach-
region-face (noting how China’s approach to the island dispute reflects a broader
pattern of “growing regional assertiveness”).
130 See Over These?, supra note 4, at 13.
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outlandish, sovereignty claims to avoid foreclosing future
bargaining points. An agreed boundary would eliminate the need
for this unproductive behavior and allow unobstructed exploitation
of the likely extensive energy deposits under the East China Sea.
B. Conflicting Theories: The Chinese and Japanese
Approaches to Boundary Delimitation
The most recent flare-up in tensions over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands coincides with a tense 10-year
leadership transition in China, and elections in Japan.131 These
domestic concerns are likely exacerbating the dispute, and
preventing either side from compromising for fear of looking
weak at a time of political importance. It has even been
reported that the massive anti-Japanese protests in mainland
China have been orchestrated and promoted by the Chinese
government, possibly as a distraction from social and political
issues.132 Fortunately, China’s new Communist Party leadership
has now been announced,133 and elections in Japan were held on
December 16, 2012.134 This will hopefully relieve some of the need
to cater to domestic audiences in both countries, allowing leveler
heads to prevail in dealing with the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.
While the dispute over the islands is unlikely to reach a
final resolution in the near future, the political actors on both
sides would be wise to take this opportunity to set sovereignty
issues to one side in order to make headway on weightier issues.
The related area where progress is most needed is with regard to
the currently undefined seabed boundary between China and
Japan. The lack of a clear boundary has caused a great deal of
uncertainty, and continues to prevent full-scale exploration and
exploitation of available energy resources in the area. Because
sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands will have little if any
impact on placement of the boundary,135 there is no reason to delay
delimitation until the sovereignty issue is resolved.
Unfortunately, because neither party has expressed any
interest in submitting the boundary delimitation to an
international tribunal for a binding resolution, delimitation
131 Id.
132 Protesting Too Much, supra note 23, at 53.
133 T. P., Habemus Papam! China Reveals its New Leaders, ECONOMIST (Nov. 15,
2012), http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/11/china-reveals-its-new-leaders.
134 Japan’s Election: Go On Mr. Abe, Surprise Us, ECONOMIST (Dec. 22, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21568731-new-prime-ministers-first-term-
power-was-disaster-it-need-not-be-way-again-go.
135 See supra Part III.
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will have to be effected by bilateral negotiation.136 This will be
quite challenging. Aside from the numerous issues souring
Chinese–Japanese relations in general, including Japan’s
imperial past and China’s rising power, maritime boundary
delimitation negotiations will be plagued by the parties’
extremely divergent methodological approaches to delimitation.
But there is room for compromise on both sides, and a final
resolution is not beyond the realm of possibility.
1. The Chinese Approach to Maritime Boundary
Delimitation
China’s official position regarding the maritime border
between China and Japan adheres to the natural prolongation
principle, as expressed in the 1969 North Sea cases.137 Under
this principle, China insists that it is entitled to an extension of
its EEZ out to 350 nautical miles, giving it exclusive rights over
nearly the entire East China Sea, all the way up to the
Okinawa Trough, a stone’s throw from the Japanese Ryukyu
islands.138 As noted above, the natural prolongation approach to
boundary delimitation focuses on the idea that the continental
shelf is a “natural prolongation” of the coastal state’s land
mass.139 This approach therefore has the effect of affording
primary importance in making delimitation decisions to
geological and geomorphological conditions.
Taking its cue from the North Sea line of cases, China
continues to insist that the “equitable solution” referred to in
UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 is consistent with the natural
prolongation principle. In a government policy document
entitled “Working Paper on Sea Area within the Limits of
National Jurisdiction,” China laid out its approach to boundary
delimitation.140 The document references geographical and
geological conditions, as well as the existence of natural resources
and economic development needs as relevant delimitation
factors.141 The inclusion of geological factors most closely reflects
136 See Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 5, at 937-38.
137 Lee, supra note 48, at 11; see also Kosuke Takahashi, Gas and Oil Rivalry
in the East China Sea, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (July 27, 2004), http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/Japan/FG27Dh03.html.
138 Lee, supra note 48, at 11.
139 See supra Part I.
140 Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, Working Paper on Sea Area within
the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L34 (July 16, 1973) reprinted
in JEANETTEGREENFIELD, CHINA’SPRACTICE IN THELAWOF THESEA 230-32 (1992).
141 Id.
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China’s adherence to the natural prolongation principle. As
international tribunals, especially the ICJ, moved away from
natural prolongation, it became clear that the geology and
geomorphology of the ocean floor was of little relevance to
delimitation decisions.142 But China continues to claim
sovereignty over the entire seabed all the way out to the
Okinawa Trough, “contend[ing] that this geomorphological
feature constitutes the natural frontier between the continental
shelves of China and Japan.”143
This view is not completely without support in
UNCLOS. The provisions on the continental shelf expressly
allow for a coastal state to extend its area of exclusive resource
rights out to a maximum of 350 nautical miles, if such a claim
is supported by the actual natural prolongation of the state’s
land area under the sea.144 However, the Article is unclear
about how this principle should be interpreted when an
extended shelf would conflict with the EEZ of another country.
Furthermore, international tribunals have expressly decided
against allowing such extensive claims to seabed in such cases,
as discussed in Part V.A. below.145
2. The Japanese Approach to Maritime Boundary
Delimitation
Japan’s official position regarding the maritime border
between China and Japan in the East China Sea adheres
strictly to the median line, or equidistance, approach.146 This is
the approach most closely embodied in UNCLOS.147 Although
UNCLOS does not expressly mention the equidistance
principle with regard to areas where EEZs collide, it is likely
that the mention of “equitable principles” in this regard
incorporates the equidistance idea found in the Articles
regarding the territorial sea.148 International courts and
tribunals most often take this approach in delimitation cases.149
The modern trend in delimitation cases shows a growing
consensus that equidistance/special circumstances is the
appropriate framework.
142 See Kozyris, supra note 117, at 349.
143 Lee, supra note 48, at 13.
144 See UNCLOS, supra note 26, at art. 76.
145 See infra Part V.A.
146 Lee, supra note 48, at 7.
147 Id.
148 See UNCLOS, supra note 26, at art. 15.
149 See supra Part III.
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V. SUGGESTIONS FORMOVING FORWARD
A. Necessary Compromises
As currently expressed, the claims of China and Japan
overlap by approximately 81,000 square miles.150 Clearly,
neither side will be willing to sacrifice that entire area by
agreeing to fully adopt the other side’s delimitation approach.
Thus, to reach a mutually beneficial agreement on the boundary
between China and Japan in the East China Sea, both parties
must compromise on their expressed claims and desired
approaches. Such a compromise will require extremely strong
political will in the face of prevailing nationalistic fervor and
domestic political concerns, but these obstacles should not be
insurmountable, considering the enormous economic benefit
attendant to a successful development agreement.
First, China must drop its adherence to the “natural
prolongation” principle. This idea has been superseded by the
1982 UNCLOS agreement, as confirmed by subsequent ICJ
case law. While the natural prolongation principle is still
mentioned in the UNCLOS provisions dealing with an
extended continental shelf, the decisions of international
adjudicators have made clear that this principle loses all
relevance when it conflicts with the base 200-nautical-mile
EEZ of another state. The ICJ, in the Libya/Malta case, stated
the modern view as follows:
The Court . . . considers that since the development of the law
enables a State to claim that the continental shelf appertaining to it
extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever the
geological characteristics of the corresponding sea-bed and subsoil,
there is no reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical
factors within that distance either in verifying the legal title of the
States concerned or in proceeding to a delimitation as between their
claims. [For areas] situated at a distance under 200 miles from the
coasts in question, . . . the geological and geomorphological
characteristics of those areas are completely immaterial.151
It is clear that, under widely accepted international law
concerning maritime boundary delimitation, China’s claim of a
continental shelf extending all the way out to the Okinawa
Trench, well within 200 nautical miles of the Japanese coast, is
untenable. Bold claims of sovereignty over nearly the entire
150 East China Sea, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/countries/
analysisbriefs/east_china_sea/east_china_sea.pdf (last updated Sept. 25, 2012).
151 Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 35 (June 3).
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East China Sea naturally lead to deep concern among China’s
neighbors, and cast doubt on China’s commitment to international
norms. Progress toward a mutually agreed-upon delimitation will
be completely stymied until China drops its adherence to the
outdated and outmoded natural prolongation principle.
Japan, meanwhile, must be willing to allow for
adjustment of the equidistant line in China’s favor. Modern
delimitation case law, in taking “relevant circumstances” into
account, reflects the idea that coastline length may be relevant
when adjusting the equidistant line.152 China’s extensive
coastline would likely compel an adjudicator to shift the line
somewhat in China’s favor.153 A pure median line approach
would fail to take account of the enormous discrepancy between
the lengths of China’s and Japan’s relevant opposing
coastlines, leading to an inequitable result.
In seeking an equitable solution, the ICJ has often taken
into account relative coastal lengths in order to shift the median
line toward one of the parties. For example, in the Gulf of Maine
case, the ICJ noted that it was “obvious that the length of the
coasts belonging to the United States . . . is considerably greater
than that of the coasts belonging to Canada,” and went on to
consider coastal length a “special circumstance of some weight,
which . . . justifie[d] a correction of the equidistance line . . . .”154
Similarly, in the St. Pierre and Miquelon case, “the ICJ made
positive references to proportionality, but rejected the notion
that the ratio of coastal lengths should itself be
determinative . . . , and sought its own solution in the form of
concrete lines, apparently taking into account proportionality,
but without quantified particularization.”155
China, with a coastline many times longer than the
relevant opposite coastline of Japan, should be entitled to a
significant adjustment of the median line in its favor. Japan’s
adherence to a strict median line approach, without allowing for
such adjustment, stands as a roadblock to reaching an appropriate
delimitation of the seabed boundary between the countries.
152 See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 322 (Oct. 12).
153 See Peterson, supra note 42, at 453 (“China has the fourth longest coastline
in the world, but it would only have the tenth largest maritime resource zone if the
Japanese median approach is adopted.”).
154 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 322.
155 Kozyris, supra note 117, at 354 (internal footnotes omitted).
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B. Suggested Amendment to UNCLOS
Sovereignty disputes over small islands, similar to the
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, exist in numerous parts of the
world.156 It is highly likely that at least some of these disputes
are primarily motivated by a belief that sovereignty will bring
with it extensive resource rights. To avoid these types of
disputes in the future, greater definition of the Regime of Islands
under UNCLOS is needed. Article 121 of UNCLOS, which defines
the status of islands and rocks under the modern law-of-the-sea
regime, contains a mere three lines of text and provides little
guidance to state actors. While the decisions of international
tribunals have fleshed out the customary understanding of these
provisions, indicating that small, offshore features are not
entitled to the full complement of sovereignty zones, this
approach has not been universally accepted by state actors.
UNCLOS expressly provides for a procedure by which
amendments to its provisions can be adopted.157 An amendment to
the Convention clearly indicating that small, uninhabited islands
are not entitled to their own EEZs would be extremely valuable.
Such an amendment should contain express, but flexible,
guidelines concerning land area, population, and economic
activity to provide guidance to state actors. The International
Hydrographic Bureau has already formulated a mathematical
definition of various island types based on land area.158 These
definitions could be incorporated into UNCLOS, along with
appropriate references to population and other relevant concerns,
giving state actors a much clearer perspective from which to
approach sovereignty disputes. If both sides are fully aware that
a particular island will not be entitled to extensive maritime
zones, they are far less likely to escalate any dispute.
CONCLUSION
The Senkaku/Diaoyu sovereignty dispute is a political
distraction that has precluded progress on broader boundary
156 See generally ROBERT W. SMITH & BRADFORD L. THOMAS, ISLAND DISPUTES
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: AN EXAMINATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND DELIMITATION
DISPUTES (Clive Schofield & Andrew Harris eds., 1998) (discussing numerous island
disputes around the world).
157 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 312-16, Dec. 10
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
158 See Leticia Diaz, Barry Hart Dubner & Jason Parent, When is a “Rock” an
“Island”? – Another Unilateral Declaration Defies “Norms” of International Law, 15
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 519, 535 (2007).
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delimitation issues, and thereby impeded cooperation in the
joint exploitation of East China Sea resources. Political actors
on both sides of the dispute are highly cognizant of the various
norms of international law relevant to law of the sea matters,
and are likely aware that the islands, on their own, carry little
to no strategic advantage in terms of resource rights. Thus, a
negotiated boundary delimitation is the only plausible legal
and diplomatic means of determining China’s and Japan’s
respective rights to seabed resources. An agreed-upon
boundary, or at least a long-term joint development agreement,
would allow more rapid development of the existing seabed
energy resources, feeding the growing Asian economies and
reducing dependence on imports.
The sovereignty dispute should be set aside, as has been
done in the past,159 to focus attention on the more weighty issue
of boundary delimitation. While there will remain a number of
challenges to overcome in reaching any lasting solutions,
including the memory of Japan’s imperial history of aggression
in the region, and contemporary regional fears of a powerful
China acting outside the norms of international relations, the
benefits to be gained by both sides as a result of an agreement
should outweigh such concerns. Pure economic self-interest
dictates that compromise is possible.
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